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To support the activities of the Federal Research Internet Coordinating Committee
(FRICC) in creating an interconnected set of networks to serve the research community ....
two workshops were held to address the technical support of policy issues that arise
when interconnecting such networks. Held under the auspices of the Internet Activities
Board at the request of the FRICC, and sponsored by NASA through RIACS, the
workshops addressed the required and feasible technologies and architectur_ that could
be used to satisfy the desired policies for interconnection.
This report documents the results of the workshops.
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Preface
This report documents the results of two workshops held at the request of the
Federal Research Intemet Coordinating Committee and under the auspices of the Intemet
Activities Board. As such, this report represents the work of a large number of people
(listed in Section 7.) Without their efforts, these results would not have been possible.
The author (really more of an editor) would like to acknowledge their efforts and
contributions, and thank them for their cooperation in making the workshops a success.
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Network Interconnection Issues Introduction
1. Introduction
Computer networking has become pervasive and basic to the conduct of scientific
and academic activities. To provide the needed networking support to these activities,
each of the agencies funding research has proceeded to establish one or more agency
funded computer networks.
Recognizing the importance of such networking support, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) working with the appropriate personnel from the research-
funding agencies on the Federal Coordinating Council on Science Engineering and
Technology (FCCSET) Committee on High-Speed Networks developed a set of
recommendations for the evolution and enhancements of scientific and academic
networks. These recommendations axe described in three phases. The first phase
addresses the interconnection of the various agency networks into a ubiquitous
networking capability serving several hundred universities and research institutions with
a backbone network operating 1.5 Mb/s. The second phase involves upgrading the
network backbone to 45 Mb/s and connecting additional universities and other research
institutions. The third phase involves the development and installation of a high
bandwidth (Gb/s) networking capability.
The motivation for the first two phases are to achieve good performance in a cost
effective manner. The scientific and academic community is best served by an
interconnected ubiquitous networking capability rather than a set of partitioned networks
supporting only subsets of the community. Costs can be reduced and performance
improved through sharing of resources and using cross-support (e.g. using one agency's
network to serve an institution for another agency purposes rather than having to connect
each institution to every network.)
To accomplish these objectives, the Federal Research Lntemet Coordinating
Committee (FRICC) was formed. Consisting of representatives from the key research
agencies (NSF, DARPA, NASA, and DOE), this ad hoc group has been developing
strategies for interconnection of networks and evolution of the intemet in accordance
with the OSTP recommendations for Phases 1-3. In the process of developing such
plans, it became apparent that a set of issues needed to be addressed concerning the
various agency policies for their research networks in light of the desire to interconnect
such networks.
This report documents the results of a series of two workshops (18-20 June 1988 at
NASA Ames Research Center and 8-10 November 1988 at MIT) held to address these
issues. Held under the auspices of the Internet Activities Board (IAB) at the request of
the FRICC, and sponsored by NASA through RIACS, the workshops addressed the
required and feasible technologies and architectures that could be used to satisfy the
desired policies for interconnection.
The issues were divided into four categories, and working groups established within
the workshops to address each area. The first working group addressed the policies
themselves. Working with the members of the FRICC, the initial statements of agency
policies were refined so that the rest of the workshop attendees could better understand
the desired and required policies. The second working group addressed issues associated
with access control to network resources. The third working group addressed the
techniques required to support the sharing of networking resources in accordance with
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agreed upon policies. The fourth working group focussed on the end-to-end services
required to support an interconnected set of networks.
Each of the working groups prepared summary reports of their deliberations. These
reports are contained in Sections 3-6 of this document. The report of the policy working
group attempts to summarize the existing policies of each of the agencies, particularly
with respect to interconnection with other networks. The other three working groups
focussed on the technology issues needed to be addressed in light of those policies. In
each case, the working group report discusses the issues and develops an evolutionary
capability with the goal of fully addressing the agency policies. Summaries of these
reports are contained in the next section.
It is hoped that the results documented in this report will help the FRICC and the
rest of the research community in achieving this exciting objective: a national research
networking capability.
June 1989 RIACS TR 89.25 2
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2. Workshop Summary
Driving the workshop were the policies of the individual agencies and a desire to
interconnect the networks in a way that was satisfactory to those agencies. A prime
policy driver appeared to be OMB Circular A130, which states that appropriate
mechanisms must be used to assure some level of accounting for the use of the various
networks. Another important policy driver was the need for agencies to assure that
sharing of networks did not adversely impact the support of the individual agency users
_'_! their specific networks. This led in some cases to the need to be able to de "d_
po-_.f, sometimes all during a specified time period) of an agency network to
supportin'_ ks.pwn users. Finally, the need to provide appropriate supporting end-to-end
services, includlhg__.curity issues, led to the need for coordinating such services.
To facilitate the diseu_z_n of the technology issues and the presentation of results,
it w_as decided to describe the e_-olution__capability in four phases. Phase 0 represented
currently d_ployed and available capability_-While not ne_ssarily being currently used
for the suppo_ of _e policy issues, the capabilities of Phased w6_e viewed as being
currently available a_d cotdd be..........used starting today. Phase 1 consisted of capabilities
that were developed and dep'to:_hdi_ a limited number of sites. Thus, the issues involved
in using such capabilities involved mainly those of widespread deployment (plus_:_zps _.
some limited amount of development assoctated..__ith, e.g., porting of software), lh_,ase 2
represented capabilities that were relatively well understood(little research required) but
would require development activity before they could'be u_4 to Support the policies for
interconnection. Phase 3 capabilities require research to achieve, and thus represent the
-"_-_- most.f-uture capability.
While these-phases fif:c_oa_ represent evolution in availability, they should not
be viewed as'_volution in starting time for action. In all cases, research and developmeot
activities would have to start today in order ffi-at these capabilities be available in a timely
i'flanller, ::
As the working group on access control discussed the required technologies and
mechanisms, it became clear that an important technology driver was the need to label
__ _ackets with the appropriate information to make determinations of routing and resource
ax_'_" n intemal to the interconnected networks, For examp! e, if certain links in a
NASA n_'_._was to be restricted to use only by NASA users (even if accessing the
network through-"_ ._--._. nn._e-twork), it would be necessary to provide such labelling
information in the packet---'rr_-.epprt',, of the working group discusses the information
that needs to be carried in such 1-a_'_,, _._re._ for a__.uthentication , and some
capavmty."""nt'ialexperiments and development thai fho-b--d-d__d ---,;_.__".o a,£hieve__ the required_
The working grou_'p-'_r_;_,_, eharing_focussed on the technologies that would
' allow fair sharing of resources between the par_cilYattng ue, e.".c,:e¢._Thekey issue that
emerged from the discussions of this working group was the need_'_de_-ei_p _lobal
algorithms that permitted sharing andpdoritization of the use of resources. A_-
-- -,.,mule, it is relatively easy for arlagency to block low-priority traffic from travers;mg---
its network during a pv,_,,a ,,_ ,..=e__;_,,.,__-a ,','auirement. It is not so easy to do so and -- -_
assure that the external users still can receive the resources they need from the _---
/
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The working group on end-to-end services focussed on those services that are
required from a user's perspective from the overall system, and need to be coordinated
across the interconnected networks. For example, directory and security services must be
provided across the interconnected system. The key element emerging from the group
discussions was the need to establish a consistent set of mechanisms to interconnect the
various end-to-end services. These must be provided in a secure manner to assure that
the security services fulfill their function.
The working groups identified the need to carry out supporting experiments and
analysis to carry forward the interconnection of the networks, e.g. to make decisions
about the need for stream versus transaction support. Each group developed a set of
possible experiments and activities in accordance with the phases of development
discussed above. These are summarized in Tables I-Ill.
A number of possible follow-on activities were identified to be passed on to the
various Task Forces of the IAB. These are shown in Table IV.
In summary, the workshop identified a number of critical issues and identified areas
where further research and experimentation is required. It is hoped that these results help
provide a "road map" for how to satisfy agency policies and requirements in the
interconnection of networks.
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Table I
Access Control Projects
Phase 0
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
Access Control based on source/destination access matrix (for traffic not
transiting network)
Statspy experiment to determine and define requirement for transactions
"ESnet hack" for limited access control based on source/destination
addresses.
"Xerox hack" for limited access control based on source/destination
addresses.
Coloring of stream packets
Simple colors/labelling
Route filtering for access control using source/destination addresses
Incorporate "Xerox hack" into other gateways
Authentication and signature architecture
Use of complex credentials
Use of policy gateways in route computation
June 1989 RIACS TR 89.25 5
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TableII
ResourceSharingProjects
Phase0
Phase1
Phase2/3
Simpleroutefaltering
RunStatspy to detemaine source/destination traffic flows (to comply with
A130 traffic monitoring requirements)
50/50 resource management for link sharing
Color packets and observe behavior to improve traffic monitoring
Fast encryption of route and certificate packets, to secure traffic
monitoring and control
Fast mapping from source/destination to packet label/color
Demonstration of gateway using soft state
Define and support policy source routing
Synthesis of source route
Management controls and protocols
Composition of policy terms
Define and structure route set-up protocols
June 1989 RIACS TR 89.25 6
NetworkInterconnectionIssues Summary
Table m
End-to-End Services Projects
Phase 0
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
User/process authentication using passwords (origin authentication)
Mail relays for both function and system isolation
Name domains system for host name to address mapping _ ,_._.
User/process authentication using challenge/response or some other
protocol (origin authentication)
Secure-ID or other authentication technologies
Challenge/response technologies (overlaps with the previous line)
Kerberos (authentication server)
Authentication using certificates
Integrity (MACs, checksums) and labelling
Key distribution and management
Secure mail (see RFC 1040)
Certificates (see same RFC)
Security of distributed white pages
Integrity labelling, tools (MACs, checksums)
Distributed white pages for the entire interact
Use of VISAs
Certification across peer domains
Distributed computation
National file system
Trusted accounting
FirewaUs for end-to-end services
Integrity of data across international boundaries with agreed upon
cryptographic technologies
Use zero-sum knowledge to have a third party to assure integrity without
secrecy for such cases
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TableIV
Projectsfor LAB Task Forces
ETETF
ANTI:
IETF
Privacy
???
Handling of quality of service in gateways
Phases 2 and 3 of resource sharing activities
Policy routing
End-to-end privacy services
End-to-end services
luae 1989 RIACS TR 89.25 8
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3. Working Group on Interconnection Policies
Working Group 0 Members
Steve Wolff (Chair) NSF
Guy Alines Rice
Matt Bishop Dartmouth
Brian Boesch DARPA
Scott Brim ComeU
PhiU Gross NRI
Dan Hitchcock DoE
Russ Mundy DCA
Tony Villasenor NASA
Network resource sharing is encouraged by the potential for economies of scale
both in communication link acquisition cost and in provision of value-added network
services (the latter not yet demonstrated in the Internet, but consistent with telephone
company experience); it is suggested by the Congressionally-ordered network study that
resulted in the OSTP report A Research and Development Strategy for High Performance
Computing; and it is mandated by OMB Circular A-130. Technical forces in the same
direction include the additional connectivity each agency provides to its clients (actual or
potential) by acquiring the use of nets belonging to other agencies at little or no
additional cost, and the robustness afforded by the sharing of redundant paths or other
forms of"excess" capacity.
The agencies represented on the FRICC, however, have differing missions and
requirements, and these differences are reflected in differing rules and procedures for
network usage. WG0 was created to explicate the rules for network use of the FRICC
agencies, for those rules -- particularly the differences among them -- form the
foundation upon which the technical specifications of "policy-based routing" must be
built. This report, therefore, is the primary input to the technical Working Groups WGI,
WG2, and WG3.
Making all FRICC agencies' network use rules the same is NOT a goal of WG0.
Each FRICC agency has more-or-less well-formulated rules for the use of its network in
the absence of explicit interconnection with other networks and the attendant "foreign"
traffic. These rules are given below. Currently, no agency has rules for intercormection
with
networks of other FRICC agencies,
networks of other countries,
commercial networks, or
"sensitive" networks (e.g., SDInet, NASA mission-critical nets);
consistent formulation of such rules will be discussed in future FRICC meetings.
It was however noted that, in dealing with subordinate (not peer) networks, NSF has
required traffic presented to the NSFnet backbone to conform to NSF rules of acceptable
use; DoE on the other hand is tending to the more liberal policy of carrying any traffic
that meets the rules for acceptable use of the agency network offering the traffic.
June 1989 RIACS TR 89.25 9
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3.1. Existing Policies, Summarized
The following is a summary of the existing policies for network usage of the FRICC
member agencies.
NSF (draft, summarized):
Purpose is to support scientific research and other scholarly activities.
Use to support research or instruction at not-for-profit institutions of instruction
and/or research is acceptable, whether all parties to the use are located or
employed at such institutions or not.
Activities in direct support of acceptable use are acceptable.
Use for research or instruction by for-profit institutions may or may not be
acceptable, and will be reviewed case-by-case.
Commercial use by for-profit institutions generally not acceptable.
DoE (draft, summarized):
Use in which at least one party is supported by Energy Sciences funds is
acceptable.
Use by persons at DoE sites is acceptable, even if they are not supported by Energy
Sciences funds.
- Advertising or promotional activities are not acceptable.
- Use in direct competition with commercial services is not acceptable.
NASA (draft, summarized):
- Purposes are to support NASA space science programs, to support collaborating
science activities (e.g., with ESA, NOAA, USGS), and to support NASA
contractors (e.g., those involved in building scientific sensors and spacebome
hardware).
- Other activities may be supported on a case-by-case basis, provided there is no
impact to the NASA programs.
- No Eastern bloc access.
- Shared use of network facilities must be controllable and annually accounted for.
- NASA networking facilities may be made available for other uses and users on a
cost-reimbursable basis.
- Direct competition with commercial services is not acceptable.
DARPA:
- Purpose is to support network research and other DARPA research objectives.
- There may be "forbidden routes" for some traffic.
DDN (excluding ARPANET and the proposed DRI):
- Use is for DoD business only unless otherwise approved by JCS.
June 1989 RIAC$ TR 89.25 10
Network lnterconnection Issues Policies
All connections to other nets strictly regulated by mailbridges (now) or trusted
guard gateways (future).
Facilities must comply with DoD Security Architecture and with DoD Directive
5200.28 which requires C2 certification for sensitive unclassified information.
3.2. Refined Policy Statements
As a result of the first workshop discussions on policy, Dr. Cerf met with the
various agency representatives to refine the policy statements. The results of these
meetings were as follows. Note that these statements are those of the workshop and do
not represent official agency policies. Each policy is represented in Clark's Policy Term
(PT) notation 1 and then described in English. The standard Clark Form for PTs
(Hsrc ,ARsrc,ARent)(Hdst,ARdst,ARexit) {UCI } {Cg } FRICC= {DOE,NASA,DCA,NSF }
where H=Host, AR=Autonomous Region, src=source, dst=destination, ent=entry
(previous hope), exit=exit (last hop, F=Federal Agency Net, Re=Regional, U=University,
Co=Commercial Corporation, and Cc=Commercial Carrier. All PTs are assumed to be
symmetrical in these examples.
NSF
NSFI: (*,*,{ F/Re })(*,*,{F/Re }){research,support} {unauthenticated UCI, no-per-
pkt charge }
i.e., NSF will carry traffic for any host connected to a F/Re network talking to any other
host connected to a F/Re via any F/Re entry and exit network, so long as there is it is
being used for research or support. There is no authentication of the UCI and no per
packet charging. NSFnet is a backbone and so does not connect directly to universities
or companies. Thus the indication of {F/Re} instead of {F/Re/U/Co} as ARent and
ARexit.z
NSF2: ({User svcs, Expert Svcs}, {NSF},{F/Re})(*,{F/Re},{F/Re})
i.e., NSF will carry traffic to user and expert services hosts in NSF Autonomous Region
(AR) to/from any F/Re AR, via any F/Re AR. These are the only things that directly
connect to NSFnet.
DOE
DOEI: (*,DOE,-)(*,*,*) {research,support }{unauthenticated UCI, no-per-packet
charge }
i.e., DOE will carry traffic two and from any host directly connected to DOE so long as it
is used for research or support. There is no authentication of the UCI and no per packet
charging.
DOE2: (*,*,{F/Re})(*,*,{F/Re }){ }{unauthenticated UCI, no-per-pkt charge}
i.e., DOE will carry traffic for any host connected to a F/Re network talking to any other
host connected to a F/Re via any F/Re entry and exit network without regard to the UCI.
There is no authentication of the UCI and no per packet charging. (in other words DOE is
'D.D. Clark, "Policy Routing in Interact Protocols," Version 1.1, May 19, 1988.
Note: I can't actually decide whether it should be aa stated above or (*,{F/Re},{F/Re }X*,[F/Re},{F/Re })
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more restrictive with its own traffic than with traffic it is carrying as part of a resource
sharing arrangement.)
NASA
NASAl: (*,*,*)(*,NASA,-) {NASA-research, support} {unauthenticated UCI,no-per-
packet-charge}
i.e., NASA will accept any traffic to/from members of the NASA AR, but no transit. No
UCI authentication and no per packet charge.
NASA2: (*,{F},*)(*,{F} ,*){research,support} {per-packet accounting, limited to n%
of available BW }
i.e., NASA will carry transit traffic to/from other federal agency networks if they are for
research and if the total use of available BW by non-NASA Federal agencies is below
n%. 3
NASA3: (*,{Co},*} (*,{F/R/U},-) {NASA research,support} {not authenticated UCI,
no per packet charge }
i.e., NASA will carry commercial traffic to federal and regional and university ARs for
NASA research or support but it will not allow transit. The particular entry AR is not
important.
NASA4: (*,*,-)(*,*,-){ } {per-packet-charge to recoup cost, limited to n% of available
BW}
i.e., On a case by case basis, NASA will consider non-NASA traffic on a cost-reimbursed
basis. It will not carry transit traffic on this basis.
DARPA
DARPA 1: (*,* 2)(*,DARPA,-) {research,support } {unauthenticated-UCI, no per packet
charge }
i.e., DARPA will carry traffic to/from any host in DARPA AR from any external host
that can get it there so long as UCI is research or support. No UCI authentication or per
packet charge.
DARPA2: (*,*, {F/R/U/Co })(*,*, {F/R/U/Co }) {research,support } {unauthenticated-UCI,
no per packet charge, non-interference basis }
i.e., DARPA wiU carry traffic for any host connected to a F/Re/U/Co network talking to
any other host connected to a F/Re/U/Co via any F/Re/U/Co entry and exit network, so
long as there is it is being used for research or support, and the network is not heavily
congested! There is no authentication of the UCI and no per packet charging. 4
DCA
DDNI" (mailbridge,DDN,-)(*, {F/Re }, {F/Re }) {research,support } {unauthentic ated
UCI, all incoming packets marked, per-kilopacket charge }
3 No'," that this non-interference policy type needs some mote work in terms of integrating it into the routing algorithms.
' Nora: DAR.PA would like to say something about the need to enter the DARPA AR at the point closest to the destination but I
dont know how to exprcu this.
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i.e., DDN will not carry any transit traffic. It will only accept and send traffic to and
from its mailbridge(s) and only from and to hosts on other F/Re nets.
An Example Regional s
Regional 1: (*, {F/ReAr },{ F/ReAr })(*, {F/ReAr },NSF) {research,support }
{unauthenticated UCI, no-per-packet charge }
i.e., The Regional will carry traffic from/to any directly connected F/ReAr network to any
F/ReAr network via NSF if it is for a research or support UCI. (NSF requires that all
Regional networks only pass it traffic that complies with its, NSF's, policies!)
Regional2: (*, {F/ReAr }, {F/ReAr })(*, {F/ReAr },Cc ) {} {unauthenticated UCI, per-
kilopacket charge }
i.e., The Regional will carry traffic from/to any directly connected F/ReAr network to any
F/ReAr network via a commercial carrier regardless of its UCI. In this case the packets
are charged for since the commercial carrier charges per kilopacket.
sNo'-: No in,-rvicw was done for this one. This isjust a guess.
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4. Access Control for Network Switching and Transmission Resources
Working Group I Members
Steve Kent (Chair) BBN
Guy Alines Rice
Bill Bostwick Los Alamos
Marsha Branstad DoD
Vint Cerf NRI
Deborah Estrin USC
Tony Hain Livermore
Dan Lynch ACE
Russ Mundy DCA
Anita Holmgren Unisys
4.1. Introduction
This report reflects discussions among the members of working group with regard to
network access control for the National Research Intemet (NRI). The NRI will be
composed of network resources contributed by various organizations (primarily agencies
of the Federal government). The operational model for the NRI is that of a collection of
autonomous, administrative domains (referred to as "domains" within this report), each
of which manages a collection of network transmission and/or switching resources.
(Other, higher level resources also may be shared across domain boundaries, but these
are not the focus of the access controls discussed herein.) Some of these network
resources are owned or leased exclusively on behalf of the administrative domain
responsible for the resource, whereas other resources may be jointly paid for and
administered.
There is a perceived requirement that a domain provide access control for the
network transmission and switching resources that comprise it. This form of access
control is distinguished from measures oriented toward controlling access to subscriber
resources, e.g., workstations, file servers, etc. Rather, these measures are intended to
apply to communication paths which transit gateways, circuits, networks, etc.
There are several motivations for introducing network resource access controls.
The organizations which will contribute network resources or funding for shared
resources to the NRI need to be satisfied that sharing of these network resources can be
controlled in such a fashion as to accord priority to designated users or groups of users
and to account for resource usage in accordance with OMB guidelines. It may be
necessary to bill for usage of some resources, especially commercial facilities connected
to the NRI. Some organization have adopted policies that prohibit transport of data from
certain classes of users across their networks.
This report examines various aspects of network resource access control measures
in the NRI context, including bases for making access control decisions (policy inputs),
communication scenarios to be supported, mechanisms for enforcing access control
policies, and assurance issues associated with enforcement. Formulation of specific
access control policies is outside the scope of this report and is addressed by the report of
Policy Working Group.
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This report has been prepared by the members of the working group as a result of
discussions that took place at workshops sponsored by NASA on June 15-17, 1988 and
November 8-10, 1988. Additional inputs have been prepared by working group members
during the interval between these workshops and co-ordinated by the chair.
4.2. Access Control Policy Issues
4.2.1. Policies and Models
Any discussion of access control measures should begin with a characterization of
the policies which the measures are to enforce and a definition of the model that
underlies the policies. There axe various ways to characterize access control policies, one
of which (ISO 7498-2) considers two axes: 1) the basis on which access control decisions
axe made (rule-based or identity-based), and 2) the entity who defines the policy (user-
directed or administratively directed). For the NRI environment, we anticipate the
policies are all administratively directed since they represent constraints imposed by
organizations which contribute resources to the NRI, not individual subscribers.
Discussions with organizational representatives suggest that both identity-based and
rule-based policies may be employed. For example, in some circumstances an access
control decision will be made based on the identity of the user (or a class of which the
user is a member) requesting access. In many cases, possession of a token indicating
agency authorization for resource use, perhaps coupled with time and day of week inputs,
will form the basis for the access control decision. These two examples illustrate
identity-based and rule- based policies and policies that combine both policy bases are
also possible.
The security access model we assume for the NRI environment is a traditional one
involving subjects and objects. Subjects are active entities (e.g., processes) which are
accorded some access privileges with respect to objects. The processes execute in
various subscriber equipments (hosts, workstations, servers, etc.) either acting on behalf
of users (individuals or groups) or acting as entities independent of any specific, human
user. Objects in this context axe typically data paths through the NRI, and thus they
implicitly entail the use of transmission and switching resources. (Alternatively we
could consider these resources individually as the objects and the paths as compositions
of the component parts.)
4,2,2, Policy Inpuls
A refinement of policy characterization is provided by considering the range of
inputs on which access control decisions will be made. These inputs can be divided into
two categories (somewhat arbitrarily): 1) data implicitly available to the enforcement
entities, e.g., time and date or utilization and connectivity status, and 2) data explicitly
provided by subjects, e.g., in packet headers. Note that this characterization does not
specify whether the explicit inputs are provided in every packet or only in some packets,
how the inputs are validated, etc. These details are critical components of an
architecture, not just an implementation, and thus the final form of this list shou/d take
into account these considerations as well as the rationale provided below.
Based on inputs from agency representatives present at the workshops, it appears
desirable that information on local resource utilization and global connectivity be major
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implicit inputs in access control decisions. The rationale is that many agencies appear to
be adopting policies which permit sharing of resources by "outside subjects" on a
"non-interference" basis. This requires that the enforcement mechanisms be cognizant
of the resource utilization status (congestion measures) so as to determine what
constitutes non-interfering sharing. 6 It also requires some explicit identification of
subjects to determine whether the non-interference criteria should be applied. More
refined sharing policies could take into account relative priorities for various subjects,
type of service (TOS)-based routing decisions, etc. The Resource Sharing Working
Group is focusing on routing issues which take into account quantitative measures related
to TOS. In contrast, this group has focused more on policies in which such quantitative
measures are not primary inputs to the access control decision. This suggests that a
combination of the architectural proposal from both groups will be required to address
some of the access control policy requirements described at the workshops.
Data that might be explicitly required from a subject was the topic of much
discussion. A list of candidate data items was developed and is discussed below.
Although not all administrative domains might require all of these inputs for an access
control decision, it has been suggested that the list be universally agreed upon among all
domains. The argument is that global routing determinations are affected by local access
control decisions and that it is desirable to enable subscribers (or their local policy route
servers) to calculate permitted routes before initiating transmission of data along a path.
In order to perform such calculations, each domain must publish its access control policy
and the inputs to the policy must be universally interpretable. Thus there is a strong
motivation to define a minimum set of explicit inputs to these policies.
At one point in the discussion it was suggested that any inputs to access control
decisions that were not universally interpretable could be accommodated by allowing for
"domain specific" data items. Such data items would be interpreted by only a few
domains (perhaps only a single domain) along a route. However, we note that this
concept does not seem to be in concert with the principle cited earlier (and discussed in
Clark's paper), i.e., subjects should be able to predict access control decisions for any
domain through which they might construct a route. Thus the concept of a domain-
specific access control data item as an "escape" mechanism for including additional
inputs to access control decisions may not be appropriate. Recall that no domain is
required to employ all the supplied inputs in making an access control decision and thus
inclusion of a data item in a widely known collection need not impose on domains that
do not wish to make use of the data item.
Since the administrative domains often represent federal agencies (e.g., DOE,
NASA, NSF) it was perceived that there should be some means of representing an
agency's granting authorization for resource use to the subject. This might be a
hierarchic data item, specifying both an agency identifier and further defining the
subject's privileges as granted by the agency. For example, an agency such as DoE
might grant somewhat different privileges to its employees, to its grantees and their staff,
and to other individuals engaged in work that is viewed as supportive to the agency
el'here is a potential conflict here in using local congestion measures as inputs to an acceu control decision. It is desirable for a
remote subject (e.g., policy conlroller) to determine in advance if a specified transmission resource can be used in constructing • (poll-
cy) fondu between two points in the NRI, for reasons elucidated by Dave Clark in his policy routing paper. Thus the conflict arises if
either the remote subject cannot obtain the necessary local congestion measures or if these measures are very dynamic.
ltme 1989 RIACS TR 89.25 16
Network Interconnection Issues Access Control
mission (though not necessarily funded by the agency). This effect might be achieved by
issuing to each of these subjects credentials that specify some form of affiliation with the
agency in question but with different qualifiers depending on the nature of the affiliation.
Thus we envision a compound access control data item that will specify an AGENCY
AFF/LIATION INDICATOR, consisting of an AGENCY ID and AFFILIATION
CLASS.
It is anticipated that some form of accounting for use of resources will be required
in many circumstances within the NRI. OMB regulations requires this accounting at the
agency level, and thus it might be sufficient to rely on the agency affiliation data to
satisfy this requirement. In other cases an orthogonal account identifier might be
required and so we allow for inclusion of a BILLING CODE 7 as part of the explicit
access control data. This may prove especially important in contexts where commercial
facilities are employed.
In the most extreme cases it may be necessary for an individual subject to be
identified, either for accounting or for access authorization. Although details for such art
identifier were not discussed, it seem likely that a hierarchic data item would be
appropriate, with a domain identifier used to specify the authority that vouches for the
subject's identity, plus a subject identifier that is unique within the domain. Even if users
need not be identified as individuals, groups of users may be identified for authorization
purposes. Hence we expect to see a SUBJECT ID compound data item consisting of a
DOMAIN ID and a USER ID, where this later data item may represent a group of users
rather than a single individual.
The (ultimate) intemet layer (IP or CLNP) source and destination addresses
associated with a packet, possibly including protocol identification data, are also viewed
as legitimate inputs to access control decisions, but for different reasons that the other
data items described above. Use of addresses provides a convenient means of prohibiting
access by specific devices or groups of devices (e.g., entire LANs) should it become
necessary to revoke access at this granularity. Also, one can imagine simple access
control policies that might be employed initially in the NRI and which would be based
only (or primarily) on these values. Finally, we note that these data items are already
included in every packet and are examined in the course of effecti.ng the routing
decisions which are the heart of the interact switching system and which are thus
intimately related to the objects being protected. Thus even if these data items are not
used in formulating an access control decision, they play an important role in the
enforcement of the policies. It is worth noting that the preceding discussion of data items
which are candidates as explicit inputs to access control decisions does not address how
or when these data items are created, distributed, validated, or transported in subscriber
traffic. These are important architectural issues, some of which are addressed in later
portions of this document.
TNotcthat this item may eater into the decision processormay be employed onlyfor accounting.
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4.3. Communication Scenarios
4.3.1. Connection-Oriented Communication
Different types of communication scenarios may impose differing requirements on
access control mechanisms. We observe that fine-grained access control mechanisms for
connection-oriented communications are better understood and easier to implement than
corresponding mechanisms for connectiordess communication. The rationale behind this
observation is that connection-oriented communication implies some connection
establishment procedure. This procedure is a natural place to perform access control
checks and to terminate the procedure if the checks fail. Moreover, the processing and
bandwidth overhead associated with connection establishment procedures makes the
added burden of transporting and processing access control information less onerous. In
contrast, additional processing and bandwidth for access control applied to individual
packets is much more likely to result in an unacceptable overhead if comparable levels of
assurance and granularity of enforcement are sought.
The NRI is expected to provide (lower layer 3) connectiordess service as its basic
interface. Many proposed designs for IP or CLNP switches for this network environment
introduce a notion of "soft-state" for connectionless traffic which is roughly analogous
to treating this traffic as though it were connection- oriented. This soft state is usually
cited as a prerequisite for providing better congestion control facilities in the intemet and
for supporting more sophisticated routing, e.g., type of service (TOS) routing with
support for bandwidth guarantees.
We anticipate that designated IP/CLNP switches in the NRI will act as enforcement
mechanisms for the transmission and switching access control policy, an assumption that
matches Clark's policy routing model. The switches, designated "policy gateways" in
Clark's paper, are ideal candidates for this role as they provide the interfaces between
domains and thus have direct control over packet transport at domain boundaries. Based
on these observations, it seems reasonable to pursue access control mechanisms which
assume that some form of connection abstraction can be imposed on most (though
perhaps not all) communications. The intent is that the soft-state database could be
augmented to include additional data required for access control enforcement.
Throughout this report we shall employ the term "connection" in this broad sense
when discussing path establishment procedures, even if the interact and transport layer
protocols employed by the end points do not provide a true connection service. Ordy
when the characteristics of a communication activity cannot be effectively modelled as a
connection in this soft state sense (as would be the case in many brief, transaction-
oriented communication scenarios) will we use the term "connectiordess" to describe
the activity.
This orientation is further motivated by the relative ease with which one can devise
mechanisms for communication scenarios in which there is a well defined "initiator" of
a "connection" and this initiator can be called upon to supply inputs to the access
control process. For example, traditional vixtual terminal communication involves
establishing an actual connection, in real time, between two processes. The initiator of
the connection is required to supply authorization data to the target of the connection
before access is granted to the computation resources at the target (though this occurs
after the connection itself is established). The same holds true for traditional f-de transfer
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scenarios, even though 3-way file transfer facilities have been defined which may not
precisely fit this model.
4.3.2. Variations on Connection-Oriented Scenarios
When the scenario does not embody the concept of an initiator, then it may become
more difficult to devise simple mechanisms for acquiring the authorization data prior to
authorizing transmission of data on the connection in question. The example of
simultaneous connection initiation by two TCP instances was cited as an example of this
sort of deviation from our simple connection establishment scenario. The concern here is
not an access control issue per se but rather that two simplex connections would be
separately routed instead of one duplex connection, a situation which could lead to
anomalous behavior (in terms of performance). Note also that ISO transport protocols
CI"P0-4) do not support such simultaneous connection initiation and so the criticality of
supporting such "dual initiator" situations is not clear.
Another concem was voiced over situations in which the initiator of a connection is
readily identified but permission to traverse a path is a function of the authorization of
the computing resources being accessed, not of the subscriber initiating the connection.
The assumption underlying this concern is that the initiator of the connection would not
be capable of supplying the necessary, validated authorization data to the satisfaction of
the policy gateways because such inputs would be available only at the destination.
However, if the host being accessed could distribute appropriate credentials to the user
prior to his access, the simple initiator scenario might suffice.
These two examples indicate how discussion of access control in the context of
specific communication scenarios can be highly dependent on underlying assumptions
about details of enforcement mechanisms. Many such discussions cannot take place
without a straw man architecture for such mechanisms, and the straw man must address
assurance issues etc. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to characterize the range of
communication scenarios which need be supported in order to establish a reference for
evaluating such straw men. Thus we will continue exploring communication scenarios
and postpone enforcement mechanism discussion until the next section.
4.3.3. Electronic Messaging
Electronic mail poses something of a problem for connection-oriented access
control models for several reasons. First, the initiator of a connection established for
mail transfer is generally not the message originator and may not even have any
relationship to the originator or a recipient. In fact, staged delivery of mail permits relay
points which have no affiliation with the message originator or any recipient. This
decoupling raises concerns with respect to assurance of access control inputs. Second,
identifying a single subject for access control purposes becomes difficult in this context
as multiple message originators may be served by a single mail transfer connection.
Third, if traffic destinations are included in an access control decision, the multi-recipient
characteristic of many messages further complicates the process.
We could accommodate mail transfer by treating mail transfer agents (MTAs) as
subjects and according to them a set of privileges appropriate to ensure mail delivery
throughout the NRI, though that may not translate into allowing every MTA to access
every other MTA directly or via any possible network path. This approach sacrifices fine
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granularity access control, and possibly efficiency of mail transfer, for simplicity. The
fact that mail generally does not require the low delay paths s (which we anticipate will
be the most scarce resources) may make this approach more palatable. If commercial
paths are employed and fine grained billing is required, this approach delegates
responsibility for per-user billing to the message handling system (as envisioned in X.400
recommendations). This approach is analogous to the access control technique typically
adopted for end-system access control with regard to mail.
4.3.4. Transaction-Oriented Communication
Various brief, connectionless interactions will take place between servers
interactions am so brief and may be so dispersed over time that they do not fit the
connection abstraction noted above. Nonetheless, some form of access control must be
allied to all traffic if the access control facilities am to be effective (complete mediation).
Such interactions may best be accommodated by not requiring any connection-like
authorization procedure, but rather by requiring the access control enforcement points to
recognize such interactions (perhaps based on source/destination addresses) and permit
them on the basis of fairly static authorizations. This "specia/case" treatment for
connectionless traffic is likely to be acceptable only if the resulting traffic volume is
fairly low. Some form of auditing of these traffic flows would still be necessary 9 to
support the accounting requirements cited in section 1 and would provide a basis for
detecting anomalous patterns that might be indicative of misuse.
File server interactions may not fit this profile, despite the fact that they are
transaction-orientated communications. If the quantity of data remmed in response to a
small query is quite large, e.g., an entire file or directory, then the traffic volume would
likely be too large to treat as above. Fortunately, most file server interactions would
likely be local and thus not subject to the access controls we are discussing, i.e., the
transfers would not cross domain boundaries. However, a homogeneous collection of file
servers in different geographic locations might generate significant amounts of traffic in
response to user commands. This poses the potential problem of large data transfers
initiated from hosts which employ connectionless protocols and which operate on behalf
of (non-resident) users. The furst aspect of this problem could be addressed by requiring
use of connection-oriented protocols for such transfers (a not unreasonable suggestion for
other than local transfers anyway). The second aspect of the problem either requires
enforcement mechanisms which support such "proxy" operations or adoption of policies
which do not require fine grained access control (so that identification of the tile server
rather than the specific user is sufficient).
_II clcctxo_c mai! o_¢r_ 17riodty s_rvice caa_gories which hmC_os_d s_Vnt limits on ddivery _lays_ d_n thiJ vn_rad com.
_t might not hold.
_If the volume is sufficiently low, tl_ traffic might t_ eonsiderv.d part of tl_ "noi_ floor" for tim _ and not explicitly ac-
counted for, as would b¢ _ caa¢ for routing updates, eta.
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4.3.5. Multicast Communication
One other class of communication was very briefly discussed which was also not
well represented by our simple connection-oriented model, i.e., multicast
communication. At least some of the concerns about support for multicast seem to have
arisen in conjunction with discussion of the need to factor in the authorization associated
with the destination of a packet as well as its source. Again, the underlying assumption
seems to be that the destination might be required to provide some authorization
information data which only it would possess and acquiring this data would become even
more complex in scenarios where the packet is addressed to multiple destinations.
One can distinguish two classes of multicast communication: transaction- oriented
and stream-oriented. The latter has been typical of conferencing communication while
the former is typical of server location queries etc. Transaction-oriented multicast
communication might be accommodated by the static, address-based access control
mechanisms discussed in section 4.3.4. Stream-oriented multicast typically involves
some form of stream establishment procedure prior to transmission of user data and it
does not seem unreasonable to augment such procedures to accommodate authorization
data transfer. Thus multicast communication may not be so difficult to accommodate as
originally suggested.
4.4. Access Control Architectures
Access control policies can be examined independent of enforcement mechanisms
and architectural details, but there are limitations to such isolated examination, as noted
in section 4.3. There are several reasons for adopting a (straw man) architecture in which
to consider such policies. First, one must identify the transmission costs, e.g., in terms of
processing overhead or bandwidth reduction, associated with enforcement mechanisms in
support of policies. Second, one must understand how policies representations and
authorization data are managed in order to estimate the infrastructure costs (additional
servers and databases, dissemination of authorization data, human management for the
databases and equipment, etc.) associated with such policies. Third, one must understand
where trust is vested in the architecture in order to gage its social acceptability and
establish the level of assurance that might be accorded the resulting access control
system.
In this section we discuss how operating system security principles might be applied
in this access control context.
4.4.1. Analogies with Operating System Security
In discussing mechanisms for network resource access control, it is useful to
compare them to some of the enforcement precepts generally applied to operating system
access control mechanisms. In the context of computer systems (subscriber resources)
the concept of a "reference monitor" is widely used. A reference monitor mediates all
accesses by subjects to object s . (For any reasonable degree of implementation assurance
the reference monitor must itself be protected from tampering so that it cannot be
circumvented.) Before any object is accessed, the authorization of the subject to access
the object, and to operate on it in the fashion requested, is checked. This a priori
checking is deemed essential if the reference monitor is to prevent the unauthorized
release or modification of data. Despite the use of reference monitors, even in relatively
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high assurance operating system implementations, there are usually covert channels via
which data can be released to unauthorized subjects at relatively low data rates, to
Complete elimination of these covert channels is usually deemed impractical except in
the most sensitive applications. Auditing of object accesses is often performed in
addition to the access control enforcement described above and post access analysis may
be carried out. However, this analysis is best viewed as a damage control measure and a
possible means of detecting anomalous usage patters, not an primary enforcement
mechanism.
In the context of network resource access control, neither disclosure nor
modification of subscriber data is at risk. (Recall that traffic analysis is not a service
considered here, but rather is a subscriber security service considered by the End-to-End
Working Group). Instead the primary concern is transmission of packets via paths which
axe not unauthorized, i.e., unauthorized consumption of resources. A major failure of
these controls could result in denial of service for authorized users, but minor failures
result only in some small amount of "theft of service." The impression provided by the
report of the Policy Working Group is that such minor violations would be acceptable in
the context of most, though not all, of the articulated access control policies for switching
and transmission resources. 11
This suggests that it is appropriate to adopt enforcement mechanisms which axe
resistant to attacks which would result in major violations of the access control policies,
but that perfect control of traffic flows is not essential (analogous to information
disclosure via covert channels in the operating system context). It also suggests that post
access auditing is appropriate as a damage control measure and to verify that authorized
subjects have not engaged in usage patterns which call into question their
trustworthiness. Thus we suggest adopting a reference monitor-like approach for our
access control policies, but with the understanding that perfect access mediation is
probably infeasible and unnecessary.
4.4.2. Clark's Policy Routing Model and Access Control
We adopted as a straw man architecture the design presented by Dave Clark in his paper
on policy routing. 12 Many of our discussions were influenced by the concepts and
mechanisms proposed in the paper. In this section we review those aspects of the design
which are relevant to our access control concerns, discuss areas which were not
completely specified in Clark's paper, and explore some modifications and extensions to
this design.
Clark's paper defines three new entities in the internet which participate in policy
routing and thus network resource access control. Enforcement of policy route
constraints is the responsibility of policy gateways. These gateways are present at the
i0 Data rams on the order of 1-10 bits per second ate typical for covert channels in this context.
uIt is clear that some access con_ol policies would not be satisfied by inherent limitations of the type suggested here and thus
wonkl not be accommodated by the architectures proposed herein. For example, NASA is unlikely to trust such architectures to en-
force a non-interference policy for network resources critical to shuttle operations during a mission.
lz"Policy Routing in Interact Protocols," Version 1.1, May 19, 1988.
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interfaces between domains 13 and thus are capable of controlling the flow of all traffic
into or out of a domain. Within each domain are one or more policy servers. 14These
devices serve several functions and are, in many respects, the heart of the access control
system proposed by Clark. A policy server serves as the repository for and the
management interface to inter-domain access control policies for its domain. Thus it
provides representations of these policies to policy servers in other domains and it
acquires from them policies applicable to their domains. A policy server responds to
queries from subjects on hosts within its domain, synthesizing valid routes based on the
subject's communication requirements, the PS's knowledge of current interact
connectivity, and of applicable inter-domain access control policies. A policy server
provides the selected policy route(s) to the subject, along with authorization and billing
data, cryptographically sealed by the policy server. This operation is best viewed as a
digital signature process.
A central feature of this proposal is that it requires the policy gateways to trust the
policy servers that represent a domain but does not require this trust to be extended to
each subject within the domain. Clark assumes that domains are mutually trustworthy to
the extent that the policy gateways rely on the source policy server to have correctly
evaluated the subject's authorization to make use of a given policy route. Since domains-
in the NRI represent organizations (e.g., Federal agencies) there may be a reasonable
basis for assuming that the individuals managing a policy server on behalf of a domain
can be relied upon to operate in a responsible manner. (The trustworthiness of the
hardware and software upon which a policy server is implemented is a separate concem.)
Note that the means by which a policy server ensures that a validated route is properly
bound to an authorized subject within the domain is a local matter, not specified by the
architecture.
Signing of this collection of data serves several purposes. As noted above, the
policy server for a domain is vouching for any identification and billing data and is also
stating that it has selected a route which is allowed by the access control policies
provided by other domains. Clark notes that this does not preclude checking of route
validity by policy gateways, but it does allow mutually trusting domains to rely on these
checks performed by the originating domain's policy server. It is advantageous that the
signature be generated using asymmetric cryptography so that the policy gateways have a
non-repudiable record of these claims by a policy server (which might prove useful
should disputes arise or in isolating faults). Since only policy servers generate the
signatures, the task of managing keys for signature validation becomes manageable.
Clark proposed that an initial packet include an IP option consisting of signed
policy route data (including billing and authorization information), but that subsequent
packets contain only a short form of the policy route option with a "handle" from the
option in the original packet. The handle would be generated by the policy server in the
source domain and would uniquely identify the current route (based on the combination
of the domain identifier and the route identifier). The policy gateways would cache the
policy route using the handle as a search key and subsequent packets would be validated
'Jclark employed the terra "Administrative Region" but we adopted the tema "Administrative Domain" to avoid any implica-
tiom of geographic locality.
t, Clark de.signa,,'d these dcvic_ "Policy Controllers" but we have adopted our current designation to avoid confusion that
might from use of the acronym "PC."
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by determining if the handle was present in the cache and by processing the packets
according to the policy route associated with the cache entry.
This approach to individual packet validation differs from others which have been
proposed, e.g., Estrin's VISA schemes, ts in that is does not assume a crypto checksum
binding authorization data to packet contents. Thus it is possible to copy a valid header
from a legitimate packet and prepend it to a packet content not associated with the valid
header. Clark argues that this is an acceptable vulnerability since the access control
afforded here only applies to transmission and switching resource utilization, not
information disclosure. The utility of "appropriating" valid packet headers is limited so
long as the policy gateways match source and destination addresses against those held in
the cache (as specified in the signed, policy route option). However, in circumstances
where use of resources results in actual bills, unauthorized transmission of packets using
copied, valid headers or forgery of valid headers could result in spurious charges to
legitimate users.
In his paper, Clark proposes inclusion of a 16-bit signature and a handle composed
of a 16-bit domain identifier and a 16-bit route identified unique within the domain in the
policy route option. It was not clear if the short form of this option would also contain a
signature, though most of the working group membership believed this might have been
implied. We observe that a 16-bit signature is probably insufficient to preclude forgery;
a more appropriate size quantity would be on the order of 128 or 256 bits. It is critical
that the policy route option be unforgeable and thus the extra overhead implied by the
larger signature is justified.
On individual packets traversing an established route there is a diminished need for
short form option integrity and authenticity, except to prevent malicious, spurious
charges. As noted above, if policy gateways check the source and destination address in
the packet against that recorded in the cache, there is relatively little to be gained from
forging a short form option. Since it is already possible to copy a legitimate short form
option from a valid packet, it isn't clear how much additional assurance is provided by
incorporating authenticity measures in short form options. 16 Perhaps a prudent safeguard
is for policy servers to adopt a process for selecting route identifiers so as to minimize the
likelihood that they can be guessed, e.g., using a pseudorandom process. We do
recommend that the policy route option be expanded to include some indication of
lifetime, either measured in time or in number of packets or both. This limit on the
lifetime of a route further reduces its vulnerability to exploitation by unauthorized
subjects and a packet quota could provide an additional means for detecting misuse. 17
I_,.VISA Scheme for hater-Organization Network Security," D. Eswin and G. Tsudik, Proceedings of the I987 IEEE Symposi-
um on Security and Privacy.
teWe also note that the computational overhead of validating a crypto-seal (or reasonable size) on every packet is probably
proh_itive.
17If a packet quota were imposed on a route and the route were used by an unauthorized subject, the authorized subject might
detect this if the route were to become invalid due to exhaustion of the packet quota.
June 1989 RIACS TR 89.25 24
Network Interconnection Issues Access Control
4.4.3. Clark's Architecture in Retrospect
Now that we have reviewed the architecture presented in Clark's paper and made
some local observations and suggestions, it is useful to view the architecture in the
context of our previous discussions. For example, the architecture described in this paper
supports both identity-based and rule based, administratively-directed access control
policies. It adopts a security model in which the objects are routes through the intemet
(which correspond to use of switching and transmission resources) and the subjects are
processes executing on behalf of users or groups of users and, hosts or groups of hosts
(perhaps entire domains).
Clark's architecture embodies the connection-oriented (single originator) access
control model discussed in section 4.3.1 above and thus this class of communication is
especially well served by this architecture. Communication scenarios that deviate from
this model must be examined to determine how they can be accommodated. For
example, electronic messaging would probably be handled by viewing the MTAs as
subjects rather than trying to control access on the basis of individual message
originators, as suggested in section 4.3.3. Stream-oriented multicast communication
could be accommodated as described in section 4.3.5.
Transaction-oriented communication, whether point-to-point or multicast, may not
be served very well by this architecture, i.e., it may be difficult to amortize the cost of
policy route options in these communication scenarios. However, if cache entries in
policy gateways can include "wild card" entries for addresses, then it might be possible
for a policy server to seed routes for access to commonly accessed collections of servers
etc. on behalf of all (many?) of the hosts in its domain and pass out the identifiers for
these routes to members of the domain.
The remaining deviant case involves dual-initiator connections, a scenario of
undetermined criticality. The source and destination hosts could discover that different
route identifiers were assigned to a single transport layer connection and co-operate to
use only one of the routes (using some unambiguous criteria such as comparing route
identifiers as unsigned integers and selecting the larger value route identifier). However
this solution may be viewed as being outside of the architecture in that it does not involve
the policy gateways, policy servers, etc. Another aspect of support for some
communication scenarios which generated some concern is also outside the scope of the
architecture, i.e., the need for proxy authorization. The possible need for such a facility
was noted in conjunction with file server communication on behalf of users, e.g., transfer
of a file between two file servers. It appears that the architecture in Clark's paper could
support such communication authorization, but the means by which the initiating policy
server determines that the communication is on behalf of a specified user, rather than the
file server itself, is a local matter not part of the architecture.
In section 4.3.2 a concern was raised about supporting route establishment when
permission for a route was dependent on authorization of the destination, not the initiator.
In Clark's architecture this case would not be treated any differently since it is the
initiator's policy server which evaluates the access control policy and makes the decision
and all the inputs required to make the decision are available to that policy server. For
the most part the architecture assumes the policy gateways trust the initiating policy
server to interpret the access control policies correctly at the time it generates the sealed
route option and supplies it to a subject in the local domain. Intermediate policy
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gateways can review the data provided in the policy route to confirm the decision, but the
paper seems to suggest that this independent confu'mation would not usually be carried
out during route establishment, for reasons of efficiency, though the signature should be
checked.
4.4.4. Trust Implications and Possible Remedies
In Clark's architecture, the ability of policy gateways to validate an access control
decision is limited because the authorization data included in the signed route option
does not incorporate any independent validation mechanisms. For example, the policy
gateways must trust the initiating policy server to have verified the user ID, agency
affiliation, etc. because there is no means for the policy gateways to verify these access
control inputs directly. The route verification that can be performed by policy gateways
is based on checking the signature (thus verifying the integrity and authenticity of the
route) and on matching the supplied access control inputs against the policy in effect.
Rather, the assumption is that access control policy terms and conditions are distributed
and that the data items against which the policy terms and conditions can be matched are
all locally validated quantities, i.e., they are vouched for solely by the initiating domain
through its policy server. Thus the architecture relies on mutual trust among domains,
non-repudiable (signed) policy routes, and post- hoc auditing to reconcile conformance.
If this level of mutual trust proves unacceptable in the NRI, it is worth exploring
how one might extend the architecture to incorporate independendy verifiable
"credentials." First we need to identify which credentials might need to be
independendy verifiable. One candidate is the AGENCY AFFILIATION INDICATOR.
If a connection is initiated with a policy route that claims an affiliation for which the
initiating domain is not the certifying domain, then it might be reasonable to require that
the AGENCY AFFILIATION INDICATOR be independently verifiable.
A BILLING CODE might require independent verification if the code is one which
does not somehow imply charges to the initiating domain, t8 An analogy can be made
with long distance telephone charging. A direct dialed call from a home number is
assumed to be legitimate whereas a similar call from a pay phone or hotel room requires
an independently verifiable account number unless the charges are borne locally (via
coins or billed to your room). Thus BILLING CODEs also appear to be good candidates
for independent verification, at least in some circumstances.
Finally, the other major credential considered for inclusion in policy routes was the
SUBJECT ID. Again, the circumstances in which independent verification is likely to be
of interest are those in which the subject's domain differs from the initiating domain.
Since the SUBJECT ID already includes an indication of the domain which vouches for
the subject's identity, it is easy to determine if independent verification is required. Thus
in all cases the motivation for an independent verification facility arises only when the
certifying domain for a credential differs from the initiating domain for the connection.
In order for a domain to certify a credential for independent verification, the
resulting data should be bound to a subject (or class of subjects) so as to render it useless
laClark suggested that such codes might incorpora_ an AD idendfier which would cxplicit/y establish the requisite binding.
However he was concerned that a smct requirement for a billing code to be bound to the initiating AD would unduly rcsu'ict mobile
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to other subjects. This is easily accomplished by including the subjects (subject class) to
whom the credential is issued as part of the signed credential. Note that this also allows
the issuer to distribute the credentials directly to subjects, not only through domains, if
that proves useful. Thus a domain such as DoE might issue a BILLING CODE and
AGENCY AFFILIATION ID to a researcher at a university, binding it to his SUBJECT
ID. The researcher could present the credentials to his local policy server for
consideration in selecting routes and that policy server could include the credential along
with the policy route option, o
Policy gateways could verify that DoE had granted permission to use the BILLING
CODE to this subject and that the subject was affiliated with DoE by verifying the seal
on the credential and matching the included SUBJECT ID against that in the policy
route. As above, it might not be feasible for every policy gateway to perform this
independent verification prior to processing packets for the connection, but the option
would exist and post hoc auditing is feasible. These credentials should contain a validity
date range to constrain their lifetime, and some form of hot list would also need to be
maintained by each issuing domain and distributed to policy servers and gateways to
revoke credentials, e.g., upon termination of affiliation.
This technique would reduce the level of trust accorded the policy server a'_*he . = _-
university since it could not forge the credential. This binding does not ensure that the
subject and the source address are correctly paired. However, if the SUBJECT ID
indicates that the initiating domain is the certifying domain for the subject, then one must
ultimately rely on that domain to correctly maintain subject-address bindings. _If the
subject is foreign to the initiating domain (as might be the case for a mobile user), the
incremental assurance offered by independently verifiable credentials seems fairly small.
It is not clear what form of credential binding would be useful for mobile users. The
"home domain" for a mobile user could certify that he was temporarily associated with
another (specified) domain, thus lending credence to a claim by the initiating domain that
the "foreign" user was in residence. If the logistics of generating and transferring some
sort of travel credential ("hall pass"?) could be made acceptable to users, this might
prove to be a viable means of addressing this problem. For these credentials, even more
than most, validity dates should be included to limit their lifetime. J '
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5.1. Introduction
This working group was asked to consider the question of mechanism necessary to
insure "fair" sharing of resources, in particular bandwidth.
The group proposed, as a starting position, that to permit sharing of resources, such
as networks or links, among agencies (for example), the following questions must be
answered.
- What sorts of service classes will be required? Which axe possible?
- How must the users of the resources be categorized?
- What sort of accounting for the resources axe required?
- What levels of assurance are required?
- How global is the impact of various sorts of service classes?
- What management tools are required to control multi-agency policy
mechanisms?
Two ideas are central to the discussion: service class and category.
5.2. Service Class
The idea of service class is that in order to provide a controlled sharing of a
resource, it is necessary to define how the sharing will be measured. The measurement
represents a way of specifying a service class.
In the workshop, most service classes related to policy concerns were defined
terms of relative bandwidth. The following examples were often proposed:
A link is shared by two (or more) service classes, each of which gets a
guaranteed fraction of the link capacity under overload.
- A link is shared by two (or more) service classes, some of which may not
interfere with others. That is, they axe excluded from the resource if demand
is excessive.
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An example of a service policy requirement not directly related to bandwidth is
mutual aid: two agencies that agree to carry the other's traffic if the resources of the one
is down. Half of the mechanism necessary to support this is easy: one could define a
service class for traffic belonging to the other agency, and define the service constraint
for that class. The hard part of the mechanism is to define how the switch is to know that
the other resource is down, so that the usage by that class should be permitted.
In the discussion of service classes, the following comments arose.
- Outside the arena of policy control, there are much broader requirements for
service classes, in order to support new sorts of applications. For example,
some applications require control of delay. This broader problem is usually
called the "Type of Service" or TOS problem (also called quality of service
or QOS in ISO). In this respect, the mechanism required of the switch for
specifying and measuring the services classes is just a subset of that required
for support of multiple classes of service to support applications.
- Some (non-policy) examples of service classes are very difficult to support,
e.g. those for real-time speech, or variable rate encoders (that can adjust to
changing bandwidth allocation, but must KNOW what rate they are being
offered.)
- We believe it is not difficult to provide commitment of resources to simple
service classes. For example, a gateway could be constructed that would
take packets in two service classes, and ensure that under overload each class
received equal access to a link. The problems in doing this are to control the
overhead in the gateway, which would have an impact on high-speed
networks, and to understand the global impact of such guarantees (see
below).
- The definition of service classes must be understood globally.
5.3. User Categories
In order to ensure that some user receives some service, it is necessary to identify
the packets associated with that user. This is a very hard problem, perhaps harder than
supporting reasonable service classes.
Current IP packets do not have user names in them, just source and destination
intemet addresses. But a single machine might support users with different privileges, or
a user wanting to use different privileges at different times.
In the discussion of user categories, the following points came up:
To support the sorts of requirements that were offered as examples (e.g. put
all NASA packets in service class X) it will be necessary to have some
explicit tag in the packet to indicate the packet category. This is a new IP
level mechanism.
- The level of "user granularity" is not clear. Would one tag for all of NASA
be sufficient, for example?
- It might be necessary for a packet to carry more than one tag, to permit a
user with multiple privileges to use them at the same time. Perhaps tags
could be approximate, and could resolve in different manners in different
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parts of the net.
The level of trust needed for the tag is unclear.
If a tag is abused, the use must be traced back to accountable entity, which
ought to be a human.
A very hard problem is muIticast: one packet going down several paths that
might require different user privileges.
5.4. Additional Discussion
The following comments were made about the other points in the list above.
5.4.1. Accounting for usage:
A clear requirement was that the usage of resources by different user categories be
accounted. However, the details of the requirement were not clear. It does not seem too
hard to provide a simple measure of total bytes or packets used by each class. As noted
above the hard part is defining the classes, and inserting the class information into the
packet.
If a more dynamic accounting for usage is required, then a mechanism can probably
be defined to account for usage by any pre-defined measure, but arbitrary measures will
be real hard.
5.4.2. Levels of assurance:
There seem to be two obvious levels of assurance as to enforcement of service
classes and user categories.
- Separation of traffic into classes, and enforcing and accounting for the usage
of each class, will be performed properly so long as the switch elements
belonging to each agency operate properly.
Proper separation and accounting must occur even if the switches of one
agency are mis-programmed or malicious.
The latter would be required (probably) in a network operating in hostile
circumstances; it corresponds to mechanisms to prevent denial of service. It is a level of
assurance that is hard to achieve.
The former level of assurance is much easier. It corresponds roughly to the
operation of the Intemet today. If one set of gateways is not operating properly, there
may be bad global effects that the other gateways cannot prevent. The problem is cured,
not by robust dynamic algorithms, but by detection and correction (e.g. by humans) of
the problem.
For many circumstances, e.g. conformance to OMB regulations, the weaker form of
assurance is probably sufficient. But DARPA, for example, expressed an interest in as
robust an assurance as possible.
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5.4.3. Global effects:
The problem of global effects of policy is a very serious issue, the impact of which
does not appear to be sufficiently appreciated.
Certain resource constraints, most obviously non-interference (a service class that is
excluded when a resource is overloaded), cannot be implemented except in the context of
a global routing algorithm that knows about the constraint.
The problem is the following. At the moment, the Intemet supports the idea that for
any destination address, there is one route out of a switch. If we now support two service
classes going to that destination, then each will be sent by the same route, given the
current routing algorithm. If one of these service classes is now blocked from a
congested resource, there is no mechanism to reroute that class to another resource. The
result is that the service class is totally disabled.
In other words, today ff a gateway makes a local decision to discriminate against
certain users, those users perceive a global disruption of their service.
The problem of propagating and responding to local controls is not impossible.
While this section stresses the need to understand the problem, we believe that solutions
exist. It will be necessary, however, to contemplate a major adjustment to the current
philosophy of Intemet routing. In particular, most of the promising approaches axe based
on some form of source routing.
Above it was asserted that it was not difficult to build a gateway that would make
simple resource guarantees. The difficulty is propagating the knowledge of that local
guarantee. There are some guarantees that could be enforced in today's intemet without
the necessity of global knowledge. For example, if a gateway provided equal sharing of
a link under overload to each of two classes, then the global impact would be that of a
link whose capacity changed by 50%. A fluctuation of this magnitude could not be
globally distinguished from other current forms of congestion. So there are some local
controls that can be applied safely in today's Intemet, and others (such as non-
interference) that can only be contemplated in the context of a global architecture.
5.5. Conclusions
The problem of making a local modification to a gateway to enforce a bandwidth
usage limit to a identified category of users seemed reasonable.
Associating a user category with a packet is very hard. The actual requirements are
not clear (are one or several categories required, what is the level of assurance that the
specified category is legitimate, and so on). In addition, the mechanism is not obvious.
This matter is addressed in the report of working group 1.
The problem of level of assurance is also very hard, again because the actual
requirement is not clear.
Accounting for usage is probably not too hard.
The hardest problem is redefining the routing algorithms of the Imemet to correctly
propagate and respond to the impact of local policy controls.
There axe several hard and interesting research questions:
June 1989 RIACS TR 89.25 31
Network Interconnection Issues Resource Sharing
How do service guarantees compose?
Is it possible to build multi-region systems that are resistant to attack by
malicious third-party regions?
How could user categories be managed? Are they multi-valued, hierarchical
or fiat?
How can fault isolation and service assurance be performed?
What is the relation between statistical resource allocation and possible
guarantees of access?
To avoid solving too general a problem, several questions should be asked of the
agencies.
What level of assurance is required?
What sort of user categories will be required?
5.6. Recommendations
The group proposed a number of experiments and changes that could be undertaken
at once, to better understand the problems of policy routing and resource control, and to
provide operational facilities toward these goals.
These goals are organized in three categories, things that could be done at once
using existing tools, projects with a short time frame, to provide better capabilities and
understanding quickly, and finally projects that would require longer to complete.
5.6.1. Instant projects
Statspy
Although source and destination addresses are not a precise indicator of service
class, they do provide much useful information. The so-called statspy tool has been used
in the past to collect a matrix of traffic sorted by source/destination address. This
information could be collected for shared links today to provide a first cut at accounting
for the resource.
Route filtering
Route filtering provides a way to instruct a gateway to believe only part of an
incoming routing packet, or to change parts of that incoming data, e.g. the cost metric of
a proposed path. This capability, available in most commercial gateways and in the
gated software for Unix, provides a way to control which destinations are reached by
which paths. It cannot separate service classes, but can be used for very rough divisions
of traffic based on destination address.
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5.6.2. Short-term experiments
These are experiments that could be undertaken at once, with the expectation that
they would yield results in the short term. They axe not thought to contain high-risk
research questions. They might provide some increase in operational capabilities in one
to two years.
Simple resource guarantee
A gateway could be programmed to sort incoming packets into two service classes
(based on some simple if unrealistic characteristic of the packet, such as addresses or
TOS flags), and then divide the use of a link fairly between these classes. That is, in
undefloaded conditions, each could operate without constraint, but in overload each class
would have a fair share of the link.
This would be a first demonstration of allocation of resources to service classes, and
would provide a practical way to share a link.
Observe tagged packets
Above, it was noted that the statspy program could be used to count packets based
on source and destination addresses. One could define a simple IP option, which carried
a user identification, and then use the same statspy to count these packets. A simple use
of this option would be to tag the packet with an indicator of which agency had
"sponsored" the packet.
Putting a new IP option into a packet is not hard; some systems lake Unix 4.3 BSD
provide the hooks to do this today. A simple and general way to find the proper value of
the option field would be to implement a very simple form of "Policy Server", which
could be a user process on a Unix system. One would sent a packet to the server with the
source and destination addresses, the name of the sponsoring agency, and other
credentials. In return, one would get the suitable IP option, which would just be inserted
into the packet.
This would provide a more accurate accounting of shared resources, and a first
demonstration of the concept of the policy server.
Fast encryption of the policy information
In order to ensure that policy routes, authentications and so on are not forged, it will
be necessary to seal them in some way. The obvious technology is encryption. A
demonstration is needed of a sealing technique that runs at tolerable speeds. This would
permit the introduction of a high level of trust into the accounting.
Demonstration of "soft state" in gateway
Several propositions for management of resources in gateways require that the
gateway remember some aspect of the packet sequences passing through it. The idea of
"soft state" has been proposed to capture the idea of cached information in the gateway
which can be reconstituted if lost without terminating the higher level connection.
A first project is to program a gateway to show that this sort of state can be
managed effectively, with acceptable overhead. The information stored in the state could
initially be rather simple, for example the resource g'uarantees mentioned above, or
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logging of packet tags, or enforcement of source/destination access control.
Demonstration of policy routing with Loose Source Route
Once we have demonstrated the tagging of packets, we have all the pieces of a first
demonstration of policy routing. A Policy Server module can be programmed to take the
source/destination addresses, sponsor and so on, and receive in return a Loose Source
Route IP option. This could be placed in the outgoing packet to achieve controlled
routing of the packet.
5.6.3. Longer-term experiments
The following are experiments that have a longer term focus. They deal with harder
problems, will take longer, and yield an increased functionality. They represent steps
that can be undertaken now. They should be undertaken now if increased functionality is
to be achieved in the next few years.
Define and support Policy Source Route option
Above we described a simple demonstration based on the IP Loose Source Route.
While this represents a useful first demonstration, the LSR is not suited for real policy
routing, because it binds the route to specific gateways, which is too concrete, and
because it has no fields to carry policy information.
What is needed is a new IP option to define a Policy Source Route, a more abstract
form of source route containing policy information. There is general agreement on the
need for this class of mechanism and the general form it would take. A detailed design is
now needed.
Tools for Synthesis of PSR
The Policy source route described above would be generated using information
exchanged by the various Policy Servers and Policy Gateways. Algorithms for this have
been proposed; a concrete design should now be undertaken.
Define protocols for control interaction
To provide the information for the routing algorithm, it will be necessary for policy
gateways, policy servers and hosts to exchange information. Protocols for these
exchanges must be designed.
Management Tools for Policy Controls
Current experience teaches us that we must develop suitable management tools for a
mechanism at the time that we develop the mechanism itself. The problems of policy
control are complex, and can be expected to lead to complex management problems. We
must begin the design of a management architecture for policy mechanisms.
Analysis of composability oflocal policies
We assume that an administrator of a region will express policies reflecting the local
concerns of that region. These various local policies must be composed to provide an
end to end service. It is necessary to ensure that the various local policies do indeed
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combineto permit areasonableglobalservice.It wouldbeniceto havesomeformal
understandingof what sortsof localpoliciescanbecomposed,andsometoolsfor
checkingthat theactualproposedlocalpoliciesaxe reasonable.
Architecture for signatures and sealing
To ensure the needed level of assurance, an overall strategy must be devised to
define the trust that holds between the different components of the system, and the
mechanism needed to insure the integrity of Policy Routes and related messages.
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6.1. Introduction
This section deals with end-to-end security services for the National Research
Interact (NRI). As described previously, the NRI consists of multiple, autonomous,
mutually-suspicious, administrative domains. The NRI is an open environment with a
dynamic security perimeter. Each domain may have its own security policy and offer a
unique set of security services to its own community. However, if secure interoperation
is desired across domains, these security policies must belong to a set of hierarchical,
consistent policies, and certain cross-domain agreements with respect to security are
needed. Working Group 3 focused on the nature and content of such inter-domain
cross- agreements.
A security architecture for the federally-funded research networks (which make up
the NRI) was proposed. The architecture consists of security sevices, where they are
needed, example mechanisms, and the implied common technologies and common
policies necessary to support interoperation.
First we offer the strawman architecture. Next, we introduce the concept of a
"security domain"; we discuss multi-administrative higher-level security services in
detail; then, using the workshop model (of phase 0-3 technologies), suggest a phased
approach to making the architecture a reality.
6.2. Multi-administrative Security Architecture
We define security to include, not only protection from unwanted disclosure, but
also, protection from unwanted modification and prevention of denial-of-service. This
working group suggests that a small number of security services are necessary, and that
these security services need to be repeated at various layers in the protocol and system
architecture. The foUowing chart illustrates some candidate security services, such as
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, access control and service assurance, suggests
placement in the architecture, such as user-level, host-level, gateway, and suggests
common technologies and common policies that are needed to support these security
services across domains.
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Security Services in a Multi-Administrative Domain Environment
Security
Services
Example
Mechanisms
Common Technologies
Across Domains
Common
Policies
Origin Authentication
-user/process
-host
-gateway
-realtime/deferred
- certificates
secure-B) card
certificates
certificates
challenge/response
(object registration)
Key Distribution
(common protocols/standards)
Directory Services
global ID
conventions
Origin Access Control
-user login
-host visa
-gateway policy routing
can we use policy global ID
servers? conventions
Object Integrity
-msg MACs
-file MACs
-datagram MACs
-connection MACs
-field MACs
common format for global 113
integrity labels conventions
Object Confidentiality Encryption- Key Distribution
protected wire (common protocols/standards) agreement
Service Assurance Byzantine Robust Multi-domain Network
routin8 Management agreement
The International Organization of Standards has recently adopted an International
Standard Security Architecture (IS 7498/2) that specifies five security services in the
Open Systems Interconnection model of computer networks. The five services and a
short definition of each arc:
- Authentication: verifying the identity of communicating entities (e.g.,
computer, software programs) in a network;
- Access Control: restricting access to the information and proccessing
capabilities of a network to authorized entities;
- Confidentiality: preventing the unauthorized disclosure of information;
- Integrity: detecting the unauthorized modification of information;
Non-repudiation: preventing the denial of transmitting or receiving certain
information.
A security label is security relevant information that is attached to other information
to assist in providing the above named security services. The U.S. Department of
Defense has specified the format of a security label to be used at the Intemet Protocol
(IP) layer of the DOD suite of protocols. This label is used primarily to state the
classification of the information in an IP packet. The security mechanisms then use the
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label to control the routing of the packet through the network (based on the security of
altemate routes) and the confidentiality protection to be provided to the packet.
6.2.1. Security Domains
Security needs to be considered from an end-to-end perspective. Secure
interactions across administrative domains, a security perimeter must be defined. A
hierarchical set of "security domains" could be established for the research internet. A
global security domain could then have a security policy and a set of security services
that would be enforced and supported throughout the intemet. Each sub- security domain
could then have additional security services. Security interfaces between security
domains would then be defined. Rules for data to cross these interfaces would need to be
established and enforced by "interdomain gateways".
6.3. Higher-Level End-to-End Services
In this section, we discuss services in terms of "administrative domains", which are
collections of machines and supporting hardware (nets, etc.) controlled by a set of people
who have the (recognized or assumed) power to choose what services that set of entities
will offer to other entities. We assume that entities in different administrative domains
are mutually suspicious but wish to provide some set of services to each other. Note that
the managers of each domain will define their own policies towards the provision of
services, so the entities must interact in light of the relevant policies. These policies must
be consistent; however, this is not a great restriction, since the policies will either be
imposed by an authority encompassing both administrative domains or (more likely) by
bi- or multi- lateral agreements or adherence to a mutually agreed upon standard.
We describe a set of supportive services designed to provide the basis for other,
productive services visible to the users; we also suggest some useful productive services.
The distinction between the two is crucial; supportive services, invisible to the user, axe
essentially a set of library routines designed to provide security and integrity functions in
a manner dictated by the administrative domain. Two domains must decree some format
for the interchange of information such as user IDs or file checksums, but (for example)
the NASA administrative domain may require use of ftp be allowed only to authenticated
individual users, whereas the Dartmouth administrative domain may allow any user from
an authorized host to access files using ftp. In this case, the supportive services
(authentication of the source of the ft-p request) for NASA must support per-user
authentication, whereas Dartmouth need only support per-host authentication; however,
if NASA allows FTP access by users in the Dartmouth administrative domain, some
accommodation must be made by policy (either by NASA, to accept per-host
authorization when users from entities at Dartmouth ftp, or by Dartmouth, to enable per-
user authentication when dealing with ftp requests to entities in the NASA administrative
domain). Productive services simply request of the supportive services whether some
condition is met (is the user allowed to use the service, has the file been altered in transit,
etc.) and proceed on that basis.
We describe the supportive and productive services separately.
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6.3.1. Supportive Services ""
Supportive services supply the basis for an entity in one administrative domain
accessing the services supplied by another entity in another administrative domain. To
this end, they provide access control, authentication, integrity, and confidentiality
checking.
The first class of supportive services is origin authentication. There are several
subclasses. A policy may require per-process (i.e., per-user) authentication, us_g
mechanisms such as SecurelD(tm) cards; this will require some common technology for
key distribution among the co-operating domains. A policy may require authentication at
the host or gateway level, using certificates; here, a set of directory services such as an
object registry must be common to co-operating domains. Note that there are really two
flavors of authentication here, real-time authentication in which the origin must identify
itself immediately (possibly using a challenge/response protocol), and deferred
authentication, in which the origin need only identify itself at some time, the
identification being preserved using certificates. Finally, regardless of the type of origin
authentication done, all administrative domains must have some global object
identification convention that all domains respect.
_.
The second class of supportive services provides access control based on origixl.
For example, access to a user account might depend on the identity of the requester; on
4.2BSD UNIX systems, access is controlled by the .rhosts file in the target account, with
each iine of that file specifying a user/host pair authorized to access the account. The
system assumes authentication has already been done, and controls access strictly based
on the user/host names of the requestor. Similarly, if one host needed to access services
on another, it might present a VISA or a service-specific certificate entitling it to use that
service. A policy might allow or deny access to networks based on the source or
destination of a packet (policy routing). In any case, as with the first class, this class of
supportive services requires a global object identification convention. The technology
which must be shared by administrative domains co-operating to provide these services is
not clear; perhaps policy servers would suffice.
The third class of supportive services provides object integrity. A policy might
require that the integrity of any (or all) of messages, fries, datagrams, fields, etc. be
verifiable, possibly using M.ACs or other integrity checking mechanisms. In this case,
administrative domains enforcing this policy must agree on a common format for
integrity labels as well as a common set of mechanisms.
The fourth class of supportive services provides object confidentiality, for example
by encrypting files or protecting the network wires. If cryptography is used, some key
distribution mechanism must be agreed upon in order that keys for objects in one
administrative domain be available to authorized clients in another. The administrative
domains must also agree on the encryption algorithms to be used and some common
technology for making keys available is necessary.
The fifth class, non-repudiation, will simply ensure that a requestor (or user) of a
service cannot deny that that user made the request (use) of the service. Again, the
administrative domains must agree on what types of requests are to be subject to this
service, and on the mechanism to be used for inter-domain non-repudiations. Further, the
granularity of the non-repudiation records must be decided; this impinges on accounting.
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Forexample,NASA may bill onaper-projectbasis,soif arequestcamefrom Dartmouth
andthenon-repudiationmechanismensurednon-repudiationonly in thattherequest
camefrom Dartmouth,themechanismwouldbe insufficientfor NASA's purpose;again,
thismustbesettledby inter-domainmulti-lateralagreementor decreefrom ahigher
authority.
In termsof thefour phasesusedto characterizetheevolutionof capability, atphase
0 is process(user)authenticationwith passwords;atphase1is process(user)
authenticationusingothertechnologiessuchaschallenge/responseprotocols;at phase2
areauthenticationusingcertificates,integritycheckingmechanismsuchasMACs,
integrity labeling,methodsfor non-repudiation,andissuesof key distributionand
management.Phase3 issuesincludetheuseof VISAs for policy routineandcertification
acrosspeeradministrativedomains.
6.3.2. Productive Services
Differing administrativedomainsprovidevariedservices,but mostwill want to
allow entitiesat otheradministrativedomainsto useone or more of the following
services on one or more entities in the local domain. This list is by no means exhaustive;
we have simply discussed the more common currently-provided productive services.
Undoubtedly equally or more important ones will arise in the future, or inter-domain
policies and agreements will require new ones.
Remote job execution will be essential within domains and given the advances in
the use of collaborative support services and distributed computations, important in
inter-domain support. Currently, mail transfer by far dominates this area, with file
transfers coming a close second. Both raise issues of inter-domain use of remote
resources such as disk space and CPU time, as well as confidentiality and integrity issues
(can only those authorized to read the file/mail do so? can the file/mail be altered?)
Further, authentication of the sender/author (was the letter telling me I got my raise a
forgery?) and access control will also be essential. Some of these issues are being
addressed by Steve Kent's privacy task force (see RFC1040B), which has been
examining secure and private electronic mail for some time. Finally, non-repudiation of
mail is important when electronic mail is used to make agreements or convey sensitive
information that the sender may wish to deny having sent. Extensions to more
sophisticated forms of collaborative support, such as multi-media mail or electronic
"whiteboards", will require the same level of supportive services. (Note that the
"support" service is a production, rather than a "supportive" service. This terminology
is confusing, to say the least, but it is also standard.)
Remote access of computers (e.g., via telnet) and distributed computations, the
other forms of remote job execution, will all require similar supportive services -- that is,
authentication, access control, integrity, and confidentiality. In all remote job execution
schemes, if the execution is done inter-domain, the administrative domains must use a
mutually agreed upon set of control protocols; this may be established either by multi-
lateral agreements or by some superior authority (for example, an act of Congress
dictating a protocol to administratively-independent agencies.)
Remote access comes in many forms; some computers will simply supply services
such as directory services and not allow other forms of remote access. These services
will require the usual supportive services, but will also require that the client be able to
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authenticate the server so the client can be sure it is connected to the intended directory
and the server can be sure the client is authorized to access the information. Note that
this need not be necessary for non-directory services since if access is made through a
directory server and a session key is obtained, should the client then access a bogus
(non-directory) server using the session key the bogus server will not be able to respond.
Similarly, user authentication as a productive service will be essential when dealing with
certificates designed to be used in a productive service. For example, the use of laptop
computers will require the availability of user authentication at this level.
Another resource requiring distributed use of computers would be a "national" file
system, allowing remote hosts throughout the country to access a shared set of files; it
will require not only mechanisms for the usual supportive services but also a common
interface protocol and a common file exchange protocol to allow systems with very
different file accessing semantics to use the national file system.
Due to OMB constraints at the federal level, and bookkeeping concems in other
agencies, businesses, and institutions, accounting for resources used in and by other
administrative domains will be required; since (for example) the Dartmouth
administrative domain will not trust the NASA administrative domain to account for the
use of electronic mail sent from Dartmouth to NASA, both NASA and Dartmouth would
undoubtedly track such mail and check the relevant bills. Non-repudiation of use of
service is at this point essential.
Key distribution in support of secure marl, authentication mechanisms, and other
services will require protocols and standards agreed to by different administrative
domains. Such services may be integrated with directory servers but this is a matter of
policy.
Finally, as different administrative domains communicate, network management
and control information wiU have to be passed between administrative domains, raising
issues of object integrity, confidentiality, and access control.
In terms of the four phases used to characterize the evolution of capability, at phase
0 is mail relaying, transfer, and name domains. Phase 1 technologies are authentication
technologies such as secure-I'D, challenge/response protocols, and authentication servers
such as Kerberos. On the border between phases 1 and 2 are the distributed white pages
for the entire Intemet. Phase 2 mechanisms such as secure mail and key distribution and
management mechanisms are currently under development by the IAB Task Force on
Privacy; other phase 2 items are certificates, and security of distributed directory servers
(white pages). Distributed computation protocols and controls for a national file system,
and accounting mechanisms are phase 3. Also phase 3 are "ftrewalls" for end-to-end
services, so that if the services fail over a portion of the Intemet the rest of the Intemet
may continue to reiy on the service being correct and functional (this would limit the
damage of incidents like the Intemet worm of November 1988) and also the integrity of
data across international borders, since most nations restrict the transborder use of
cryptographic algorithms that can be used for secrecy, which is true of the base
algorithms used in the computation of cryptographic checksums for integrity. Hence a
solution requires the development of a cryptographic algorithm that can be used for
integrity and authenticity but not secrecy. One possibility is to use zero-sum knowledge
mechanisms to have a third party assure integrity without secrecy, might be feasible.
Such a solution is Phase 4 (very long range research).
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6.4. Projects
The above suggests several projects that the FRICC or some constituent agency
should pursue.
- End-to-end private mail is currently in the experimental phase; encryption is
done using the DES, and authentication involves certificates built using
RSA. The mechanism allows both privacy and integrity of sent mail.
- A national file system will raise issues of access control, authentication,
confidentiality, and integrity.
- Directory services should provide white pages for mail and multi- domain
object registration; issues to be addressed include registration of services,
distributed list service, and authenticity.
- Finally, questions of multi-domain network monitoring and control are at the
heart of interconnected network operations and raise issues of access control,
authentication, and integrity.
Some common or interoperable approach to authentication, integrity, and access
control, as well as the tools and services to be provided, is necessary; note the policies
may differ across administrative domains, but the mechanisms must be able to
communicate with one another. They need not rely on each other, however; that is a
policy issue. Whether or not these inter-domain mechanisms can be built with common
facilities, the specific protocol base (such as OSI or TCP/IP) that these projects are to be
conducted, how results are to be transferred into GOSIP and a European context, the role
of vendors as opposed to researchers, and the IETF, IAB, and other such organizations,
and which agency or agencies shall take the lead, are all issues that can be resolved in the
longer range.
Notes: Reference for the use of productive and supportive services is the ECMA
(European Computer Manufacturers Assoociation) Security in Open Systems, A Security
Framework document, ECMA TR/46, Iuly 1988.
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8. Glossary
AR
CLN'P
DARPA
DES
DoE
ECMA
FRICC
GOSIP
IETF
IP
ISO
LAN
MTA
NASA
NRI
NSF
OMB
OSTP
PS
PT
RSA
TAC
TOS
QOS
Autonomous Region
Connectionless Network Protocol
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Data Encryption Standard
Department of Energy
European Computer Manufacturers Association
Federal Research Intemet Coordinating Committee
Government OSI Protocol
Intemet Engineering Task Force
Intemet Protocol
International Standards Organization
Local Area Network
Mail Transfer Agent
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Research Intemet
National Science Foundation
Office of Management and Budget
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
Policy Server
Policy Term
Rivest Shamir Algorithm
Terminal Access Controller
Type of Service
Quality of Service
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